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Abstract
We study several aspects of the so-called low-vol and low-β anoma-
lies, some already documented (such as the universality of the effect over
different geographical zones), others hitherto not clearly discussed in the
literature. Our most significant message is that the low-vol anomaly is
the result of two independent effects. One is the striking negative cor-
relation between past realized volatility and dividend yield. Second is
the fact that ex-dividend returns themselves are weakly dependent on the
volatility level, leading to better risk-adjusted returns for low-vol stocks.
This effect is further amplified by compounding. We find that the low-vol
strategy is not associated to short term reversals, nor does it qualify as a
Risk-Premium strategy, since its overall skewness is slightly positive. For
practical purposes, the strong dividend bias and the resulting correlation
with other valuation metrics (such as Earnings to Price or Book to Price)
does make the low-vol strategies to some extent redundant, at least for
equities.
1 Introduction
The so-called low-volatility (or low-β) anomaly has been noticed at least as
early as 1970 by Fisher Black [1] – who failed to convince the Wells Fargo to
launch a levered fund that would buy low-volatility stocks and sell high volatility
ones – and in 1972 by Robert Haugen – who equally failed to have his paper
[2] published before his results contradicting the CAPM model were excised
[3]. That low-volatility stocks should perform better than their high-volatility
counterpart is indeed counter-intuitive and in blatant contradiction with the
idea, deeply rooted in economic theory, that risk should be somehow rewarded by
some excess return [4, 5]. Still, concurrent empirical evidence has accumulated
since the early seventies, and broadly confirm that this low-volatility “puzzle”
is a robust, universal stylized fact of stock markets (and, to a lower extent, of
bond markets and other asset classes as well [6, 7, 8]). The effect has indeed
been persistent over time, and is documented on a variety of stock markets
throughout the world (developed countries or emerging markets alike), see e.g.
[10, 11, 12, 13].
Such a striking departure from the efficient market lore begs for an explana-
tion. Several plausible stories can in fact be found in the literature, as reviewed
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in [16, 17, 18]. Some are based on behavioural biases (lottery ticket investing
[14, 15, 19, 13, 16], “glittering” stocks attracting the attention of investors [20],
or over-optimism of analysts for high-vol stocks [21]), others on institutional
constraints (high volatility stocks as an alternative to leverage [1]) or incentives
(managers’ bonuses are in fact options on the performance of invested stocks,
and thus more valuable for high volatility stocks [22, 11]), others still based on
more ‘mechanistic’ effects, see [23, 8].
The low-volatility (“low-vol” henceforth) anomaly is thus clearly relevant
both from a theoretical and practical point of view: it challenges the pillars
of modern academic finance, and suggests interesting defensive stock strategies
that would have significantly outperformed the market in the last 50 years.
As such, it has attracted tremendous interest recently, with dozens of papers
appearing in the academic and professional literature, see e.g. Refs. [6, 9, 10,
24, 25, 22, 11, 7, 13, 27, 28, 8]. Whereas all these papers confirm that the low-
vol anomaly is strong and pervasive in stock markets, the origin of the effect is
still debated. Novy-Marx, in particular, argues that the low-vol anomaly can
actually be subsumed in more classic explanatory variables such as value or
profitability [28]. We had ourselves undertaken an in-depth study of the low-
vol effect when the paper of Novy-Marx came out, and our conclusions partly
overlap with his. Still, some of our findings appear to be new and, we hope,
help shed light on these matters. Our main results are as follows:
• We do confirm once again the strength and persistence of the low-vol
and low-β effect on a pool of 9 different countries; in fact we find that the
P&L of the two anomalies are very strongly correlated (ρ ≈ 0.9) suggesting
that these two anomalies are in fact one and the same. However, since the
market neutral low-vol/low-β strategy has (by construction) a long dollar
bias, it is sensitive to the financing rate.
• We find that the low-vol anomaly has nothing to do with short-term (one
month) stock reversal – at variance with some claims in the literature, as
it entirely survives lagging the measure of past volatilities by one month
or more. The low-vol effect is therefore a persistent, long-term effect.
• We find that, as expected, low-vol (low-β) portfolios have strong sector ex-
posures. However, the performance of these strategies remains strong even
when sector neutrality is strictly enforced. The low-vol effect is therefore
not a sector effect.
• We find that a large proportion of the low-vol performance is in fact eked
out from dividends, see Fig. 2 below. This is our central result, that fol-
lows from the strong negative correlation between volatility and dividend
yields which (oddly) does not seem to be clearly documented in the litera-
ture (but see [17] where this correlation is implicitly discussed). However,
the low-vol anomaly persists for ex-dividend returns which are found to
be roughly independent of the volatility level. Therefore risk-adjusted ex-
dividend returns are themselves higher for low-vol stocks, which is in itself
an “anomaly”.
• We find that the skewness of low-vol portfolios is small but systematically
positive, suggesting that the low-vol excess returns cannot be identified
with a hidden risk-premium [26].
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• The P&L of the low-vol strategy is ∼ −0.5 correlated with the Small-
Minus-Big (Size) Fama-French factor, ∼ 0.2 correlated with the High-
Minus-Low (Value) factor and ∼ 0.5 correlated with the Earning-to-Price
factor, which is expected since earnings and dividends are themselves
strongly correlated. Once these factors are controlled for, the residual
performance of low-vol becomes insignificant – see Fig. 5 below. This
result ties with Novy-Marx’s observations [28]: profitability measures ex-
plain to a large degree the low-vol (low-β) effect.
• We find that part of the low-vol effect can be explained by compounding,
i.e. the mere fact that a stock having plummeted −20% must make +25%
to recoup the losses. Although significant, this mechanism is only part of
the story.
• By analyzing the holding of mutual funds, we find that (at least in the
U.S.) these mutual funds are indeed systematically over-exposed to high
vol/small cap stocks and underexposed to low-vol/large cap stocks, in
agreement with the leverage constraint and/or bonus incentives stories
alluded to above. A similar observation was made in Ref. [13] concerning
the behaviour of Japanese institutional investors.
Our overall conclusion is that, while the low-vol (/low-β) effect is indeed com-
pelling in equity markets, it is not a real diversifier in a factor driven portfolio
that already has exposure to Value type strategies, in particular Earning-to-
Price and Dividend-to-Price. Furthermore, the strong observed dividend bias
makes us believe that the effect is probably not as convincing in other asset
classes such as bonds, although see [7] and the discussion in [8].
The outline of the paper is as follows. We first present (Sect. 2) our data
and methodology, and broadly confirm previous findings on the low-vol (/low-
β) effect. We then scrutinize several possible biases (sectoral, financing rates,
dividends) in Sect. 3. We decompose the low-vol strategy into deciles and
correlate it to other factors in Sect. 4. We briefly discuss the compounding
effect in Sect. 5, and analyze the holdings of mutual funds in Sect. 6.
2 Methodology
2.1 Construction of the strategies
We want to test for the presence of a low-vol or low-β effect by creating portfolios
that are long low-vol stocks and short high-vol stocks, while having zero (or close
to zero) correlation with the market mode. The performance of such portfolios,
and its statistical significance, is a test for accepting or rejecting the existence of
these effects in the data. We will consider international pools of stocks, defined
more precisely in Appendix A. We indicate in Table 1 the starting dates of our
simulations in every trading zone, as well as the maximum number of stocks
in a given pool. As we can see, we cover the main industrialised countries,
as well as Brazil, Korea and Hong-Kong. Most pools start around 1996, but
we used CRSP data for the US zone to go back to 1966; the end date for all
pools is July 16th, 2015. We need four years of data to compute a meaningful
correlation matrix for our Markowitz portfolio construction, so the P&L shown
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Pool Starting date N Risk-Free rate
Russell 3000 1998 3000 USD LIBOR 3m
S&P 500 1970 500 USD LIBOR 3m
Small Caps. 1970 500 USD LIBOR 3m
Australia 2002 200 AUD LIBOR 3m
UK 2001 100 GBP LIBOR 3m
Europe (ex-UK) 2002 600 EUR LIBOR 3m
Japan 1993 500 JPY LIBOR 3m
Korea 2002 200 KRW KORIBOR 3m
Hong-Kong 2002 440 HKD HIBOR 3m
Brazil 2001 70 BRL implied 3m
Canada 2001 270 CAD LIBOR 3m
Table 1: Starting date of the P&L simulations and number of stocks N for every
pool used in the simulation. In the last column we give the financing rates used in
the simulations rRF. For Australia and Canada, LIBOR is replaced by Accepted Bank
Bills since 2013.
below start in 1970. Also, we note that there is a high level of diversification
between these pools, which means that the universality of the effect – already
reported in [10, 11, 12] – is a priori non-trivial. Indeed, we find that the low-vol
and low-β strategies are only weakly (ρ ∼ 0.1) correlated across geographical
zones.
We first need to measure the volatility (σi) and the “beta” (βi) of each stock.
The former quantity is obtained as a 100-day rolling standard deviation of the
stocks total return. The βs are a bit less immediate to measure. We first define,
for simplicity, an “index” return as an equi-weighted average of all the pool’s
members (other definitions would anyway lead to a highly correlated strategy,
so our definition is just convenient). We then compute β as the covariance of
the stock with the index divided by the index variance, both computed over 100
days as well, but considering 3-days returns for the variances and covariances as
to take into account any lead-lag effects. We further lag these values by an extra
one month (20 trading days). Our volatility indicator is therefore not sensitive
to recent returns at all. This in particular excludes any interpretation of the
low-vol anomaly reported below in terms of short-term reversal of strong recent
rallies, as proposed in several papers, e.g. [24, 27].1
We now compute the signals si based on these quantities. To control the
cross-sectional distribution of our predictions over time, as well as to limit the
amount of noise, we use the rank of the volatility or β, rescaled between -1 and
1. In more mathematical terms:
si =
2
N
rank
(
1
σi
)
− 1 (1)
where si is the signal on stock i = 1, . . . , N , σi its volatility (as defined above),
and N the number of stocks in the pool. We take the inverse of the volatility
1We therefore strongly disagree with the following statement in [27]: In particular, we
find that the excess return associated with forming the low risk zero-cost portfolios are short-
lived as they are present only in month t + 1 and furthermore are largely subsumed by high
transaction costs., as also claimed in e.g. [24].
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since we want to be long on low vol stocks. We apply a similar procedure for
the β strategy.
However, a portfolio constructed blindly using this signal would end up hav-
ing a net short market bias, since by construction the long leg of the portfolio
is less volatile and has less market exposure than the short leg. To compensate
for that effect, we project out the market mode (using the empirical correlation
matrix, again computed using past data) which enforces market neutrality. An
interesting consequence of our portfolio construction is that the final dollar po-
sitions do not add up to zero, although the initial signal si did. Instead, the
resulting net dollar exposition is positive – see Appendix B. In words, this is
because of the re-leveraging of the (less volatile) longs that is needed to ensure
the market neutrality. But this net long dollar bias must be financed in order to
get meaningful P&L’s. We therefore need a history of risk-free rate rRF, which
we have listed in the last column of Table 1. It is mostly the LIBOR 3-months
when available, but in Brazil for example, we had to rely on implied rates. We
have quite long histories for these rates, so that we are not limited when we
perform our back-tests. Therefore, we are able to simulate the effects we want
to test over a wide variety of pools.
The final P&L of the low-vol/low-β strategies is obtained by summing over
time and over stocks the (market neutral) positions for each stock, times the
return of that stock minus the risk-free rate rRF. The resulting time series is
what we will call the “performance” of the fully-financed strategy. Note that we
do not account for transaction costs (that depend on many extra assumptions,
in particular on the size of the portfolio), difference of financing costs between
the long and the short legs of the portfolio, and dividend taxes (although we
briefly discuss their impact below). These effects are usually not considered in
the academic literature either, although see [27].
2.2 Analyzing the low-vol/low-β performance
We now present the result of the simulations we have run, and discuss their
significance and robustness. The results are summarized in Table 2, both for
the low-vol and low-β anomalies. As already documented in [10, 11, 12], the
performance of low-vol/low-β strategies appears to very robust across all zones.
In fact, there is little dispersion in the performance per pool. In particular, all
pools return a positive contribution for both strategies, with no particular bias
towards developed or emerging countries.
When aggregated in a global portfolio, these strategies yield a total perfor-
mance plotted in Fig. 1. Even if for each individual market the statistical signif-
icance of low-vol and low-β is not impressive, the global portfolios have Sharpe
ratios of 0.86 and 0.74 respectively (see Table 2), which give them a high sta-
tistical significance (t-stat) of 5.8 and 5.0. The performance of low-vol/low-β is
furthermore only weakly correlated (∼ 0.1) between different geographical zones,
and the mutual correlation between low-vol/low-β is as high as 0.88. This leads
us to conclude that these two anomalies are in fact very closely related, and we
will not really distinguish them in the following discussion. A simple argument
explaining why low-vol/low-β are so strongly correlated is given in Appendix
C. The reader must also have noticed that we consider the total volatility of
each stock, including that of the market. Some authors prefer to focus on the
residual contribution only when defining low-vol and high-vol stocks. However,
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this also leads to a strategy that is highly correlated to our definition of low-vol
and to low-β; see again Appendix C for why this is the case.
We have also tested different portfolio constructions, and always found re-
sults in line with the above. Therefore, we strongly believe that the results
presented here are not due to an artifact of our specific methodology.
Finally, we have computed the skewness of the performance for all zones. In
order to reduce measurement noise, we have chosen to compute the skewness as
the mean minus the median of daily returns, divided by the rms of the returns.
We find a small, but systematically positive skewness for all zones. Following
our discussion in Ref. [26], this suggests that the excess return associated to
low-vol stocks cannot be interpreted as a hidden risk premium, and is probably
of behavioural origin, see e.g. [16, 17] and the discussion below.
Pool low-vol low-β low-vol-SN corr 1-2 corr. 1-3 skewness
Russell 3000 0.67 0.80 0.53 0.86 0.88 0.0
S&P 500 0.24 0.14 0.13 0.72 0.77 0.02
Small Caps. 0.87 0.94 0.74 0.86 0.77 0.0
Australia 0.64 0.70 0.48 0.71 0.78 0.03
UK 0.35 -0.08 -0.07 0.66 0.67 -0.01
Europe (ex UK) 0.76 0.50 0.71 0.79 0.88 0.01
Japan 0.45 0.48 0.24 0.75 0.82 0.02
Korea 0.86 0.56 0.77 0.66 0.85 0.02
Hong-Kong 1.00 1.01 0.74 0.78 0.91 0.01
Brazil 0.45 0.39 0.02 0.73 0.72 0.02
Canada 0.71 0.73 0.51 0.77 0.74 0.0
Average 0.63 0.56 0.43 0.83 0.80 0.01
Global 0.86 0.74 0.62 0.83 0.82 0.03
Table 2: Sharpe ratio for low-vol, low-β anomalies and sector-neutral (SN) low-vol.
Although not very significant at the single index level (t-stats around 1.5 − 2), the
performance is robust and consistent across geographical zones, nor very much relying
on sectoral biases. We also give the correlations between low-vol and low-β (corr 1-2),
and between low-vol and low-vol-SN (corr 1-3). Finally, we give the skewness of the
low-vol strategy in the last column. The last line refers to the results of the strategy
applied with equal weight to all pools alive at any given date, also shown in Fig. 1,
with a t-stat above 5. Note that the statistics is dominated by the US market until
2000. The Sharpe ratio of the global low-vol strategy after 2002 actually rises to 1.41
(t-stat = 4.9).
3 Three possible biases
3.1 Dollar bias and financing costs
As mentioned above, the re-leveraging of the long leg of the portfolio needed
to ensure the market neutrality leads to a net long bias. This is actually not
totally intuitive and a simple illustrative model that accounts for this effect is
provided in Appendix B. The financing cost was accounted for in the simulation
results provided above by systematically subtracting rRF from the stock returns.
However, the difference between lending and borrowing rates was neglected in
our study, as in most other academic studies.
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Figure 1: Performance of the low-vol and low-β portfolios, aggregated across all zones
with equal weight on all pools alive at any given date. The period 1970-1990 is US
only and is also a period of high interest rates until 1980.
We found no correlation between the financing rate level, and the un-financed
performance of the low-vol (/low-β) strategy. Therefore, it seems plausible that
because of the net-long bias, these strategies would stop working if the risk-free
rate became too high. Obviously, in the 2015 situation, we are far from this case,
but it could help understand the relatively poor performance that is observed in
the US in the 70-80s. (Note that the P&L displayed in Fig. 1 is entirely coming
from the US stocks until 1998).
3.2 Sector biases
There is considerable evidence (as well as strong intuitive reasons to believe)
that the anomalies we study have persistent sectoral biases. In particular, we
expect our low-vol portfolios to be long Utilities/Consumer Non-Cyclical, and
short Technologies/Consumer Cyclical. We checked that this is indeed the case
on all our zones.
Now, an interesting question arises: are these anomalies merely exploiting
sector biases? Are they simply picking up the sectors with the best risk-adjusted
return? We decided to confront this issue directly by building sector neutral
portfolios, i.e. we rank the volatility over every sector between -1 and 1, and then
apply our usual portfolio construction. By definition, these portfolios should not
– and indeed do not – have any sectoral bias left.
We summarize the performance of this strategy for low-volatility in Table 2
(results for low-β would lead to similar conclusions). As we can see, the Sharpe
ratios are only slightly reduced, and the correlation is still very high between the
two implementations. This means that the sector component is not a dominant
determinant of the low-vol/low-β anomaly.
3.3 Dividend bias
A rather striking observation (that, curiously, we have not seen clearly stated
in the literature before) is that most of the gain of the low-vol strategy in fact
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Figure 2: Scatter plot of the dividend yield (DY, in %) of the 2000 largest US com-
panies since 1971 as a function of the past 250-day volatility σ (in %). (one point
per year and per stock, but only one random point out of ten shown on the graph,
for clarity). We find a clear negative correlation around −0.2 between dividends and
volatility, which is illustrated by the binned averages shown as the black line. Error
bars are computed for each bin, which contain 2000 points. Earning-to-Price ratio of
SPX companies as a function of the past volatility show a very similar pattern.
comes from the dividend part, as can be seen from Table 3. Since the portfolio
is market neutral, it must be that its long, low-vol stocks receive on average
higher dividends than short, high-vol stocks. Indeed, we have checked that
there is a significant negative causal correlation (∼ −0.2 for US stocks) between
past realized volatility and dividend yields, see Fig. 2. This demonstrates that
low dividend stocks are also on average high dividend yielders.
Why is this so? One argument could be that since high-vol, “glittering”
stocks are attractive because of all the biases mentioned in the introduction,
low-vol “boring” stocks must somehow compensate by offering larger dividends.
A slight variation on this idea is that mature businesses pay dividends whereas
growing (risky) firms do not. However, the causality could be reversed: not sur-
prisingly, we find a similar negative correlation between earnings and volatility.
One could thus argue that strong earnings and regular dividends make firms
less risky and therefore less volatile.
In any case, this observation leads to the concern that part of the low-vol
or low-β performance might eventually be eaten up by dividend taxes. The tax
rate is however very much investor-dependent; our analysis suggests that the
low-vol strategy can in fact withstand moderate dividend tax levels (up to 50%)
before becoming flat. Nonetheless, this is another concern for the viability of
these strategies, on top of the level of interest rates to finance the leveraged
positions.
Incidentally, the above results suggest that simple dividend yield strategies
need to be carefully risk-controlled if one wants to avoid any market exposure.
Indeed, since high dividend yield stocks are also low-vol/β, one would expect
to end up with a short market exposure if longs are not re-leveraged. This
is exactly what happens to the Fama-French portfolios based on the Dividend
Yield (DY) factor, see Fig. 3, where we have plotted the β of each of the 10
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Pool dvd/total gain
Russell 3000 88 %
S&P 500 261 %
Small Caps. 125 %
Australia 75 %
UK 64 %
Europe (ex-UK) 44 %
Japan 24 %
Korea 17 %
Hong-Kong 51 %
Brazil 50 %
Canada 59 %
Table 3: Contribution of the dividend gains (dvd) to the performance of low-vol
strategies (total gain). Very similar figures are obtained for low-β as well.
Fama-French decile portfolios created since 1950. As one can see, the highest
ranking ones have a much smaller β compared to the others. This also means
that going equally long the high dividend portfolios, and short the low ones
results in a significantly negative correlation with the index of around −0.4.
4 The low-vol strategy: Deciles and Factors
4.1 Deciles
In the following Tables, we give the Information Ratio (i.e. the Sharpe ratio of
the un financed strategy) of Fama-French like past volatility “decile" portfolios,
for all geographical zones, for both the total return strategy and for the ex-
dividend strategy.2 One sees that, as expected from positive performance of
the low-vol strategy, the Information Ratio of low-vol portfolios is significantly
higher than that of high-vol portfolios, even when dividends are left out – see
Table 5; in particular the last line that gives the average over all zones and Fig.
4. This means that there is a genuine low-vol effect here, on top of the strong
dividend effect noted in the previous paragraph. We see that the anomaly is not
localized on any of the ten deciles, but is rather a smooth bias that builds up
progressively as one moves from high-vol stocks to low-vol stocks. This remark
is at odds with claims in the literature that the anomaly is chiefly due to penny
stocks, or extremely volatile stocks that plummet.
4.2 Skewness
We have also reported in Table 6 the skewness of the different decile portfolios.
One notices that all skewnesses are negative but that the skewness of high-vol
portfolios is slightly less negative than that of the low-vol ones. This is somewhat
unexpected since, as we have noted before, buying low-vol stocks and shorting
high-vol stocks leads to a positively skewed strategy (see last column of Table 2).
2We use the same definition of the volatility as above to rank the stocks: we mean the past
100 days realized volatility, lagged by one month.
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Figure 3: βs of the 10 Fama-French Dividend Yield portfolios since 1950. The dashed
line is a linear regression through the 10 points, as a guide to the eye. As one can see,
the higher the yield, the smaller the β with the index, as expected from the negative
volatility/dividend correlation.
Pool 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Russell 3000 0.25 0.42 0.50 0.54 0.57 0.60 0.64 0.66 0.70 0.84
S&P 500 0.49 0.59 0.71 0.73 0.79 0.78 0.88 0.86 0.90 1.01
Small Caps. 0.39 0.54 0.71 0.72 0.87 0.90 1.12 1.05 1.15 1.34
Australia 0.18 0.18 0.51 0.51 0.65 0.69 0.73 0.79 0.88 0.90
UK 0.13 0.26 0.21 0.29 0.56 0.52 0.27 0.47 0.94 0.64
Europe (ex-UK) 0.28 0.44 0.53 0.55 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.67 0.74 0.91
Japan -0.16 0.16 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.35 0.30 0.33 0.30
Korea -0.35 -0.10 0.28 0.55 0.67 0.73 0.57 0.75 0.65 0.67
Hong-Kong 0.49 0.67 0.75 0.66 0.71 0.70 0.73 0.98 1.03 1.15
Brazil 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.41 0.49 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.76 0.59
Canada 0.09 0.06 0.29 0.42 0.61 0.66 0.80 0.77 0.95 0.81
Table 4: Information Ratios of the “total return” performance (i.e. including divi-
dends) of past volatility decile portfolios. (The first decile is the most volatile)
Pool 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Russell 3000 0.25 0.40 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.59
S&P 500 0.45 0.53 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.61 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.63
Small Caps. 0.38 0.53 0.68 0.67 0.80 0.80 0.97 0.84 0.84 0.84
Australia 0.12 0.10 0.36 0.35 0.44 0.45 0.49 0.51 0.55 0.54
UK 0.08 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.42 0.36 0.12 0.24 0.72 0.39
Europe (ex-UK) 0.26 0.39 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.53 0.57 0.71
Japan -0.18 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.21
Korea -0.36 -0.11 0.26 0.52 0.62 0.69 0.52 0.70 0.58 0.58
Hong-Kong 0.44 0.61 0.68 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.60 0.84 0.83 0.83
Brazil 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.36 0.42 0.39 0.35 0.31 0.62 0.43
Canada 0.08 0.04 0.24 0.33 0.49 0.51 0.65 0.59 0.73 0.57
Table 5: Information Ratios of the price return (ex-dvd) performance of past volatility
decile portfolios. (The first decile is the most volatile).
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Figure 4: Average over all zones of the Information Ratios of the total return (black
circles) and ex-dividend returns (red triangles) for the deciles portfolios, now from
low-vol to high-vol. The average is computed as a flat average over the columns of
Tables 4, 5. One clearly sees that risk adjusted, ex-dividend returns are slightly better
for low-vol stocks than for high-vol stocks. The effect is amplified by dividends.
This is of course possible because skewnesses do not simply add when returns
are correlated. Following up on this, we have checked on all geographical zones
that while the average return of high-vol stocks is better than that of low-stocks
on days where the index goes up, a stronger opposite effect is observed on days
when the index goes down. More precisely the (negative) return differential
between high-vol and low-vol stocks is ≈ 1.5 times larger when the index goes
down – leading to strong positive gains that contribute to the positive overall
skewness of the low-vol strategy. This is why these strategies are often called
“defensive”: they allow to make profits in bear market environments.
Pool 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Russell 3000 -0.59 -0.49 -0.29 -0.28 -0.36 -0.41 -0.38 -0.39 -0.48 -0.39
S&P 500 -0.10 -0.24 -0.28 -0.33 -0.26 -0.17 -0.15 -0.22 -0.16 -0.07
Small Caps. -0.20 -0.19 -0.32 -0.34 -0.49 -0.44 -0.48 -0.41 -0.54 -0.28
Australia -0.11 -0.61 -0.56 -0.57 -0.44 -0.38 -0.58 -0.43 -0.68 -0.43
UK -0.16 -0.13 -0.41 0.33 -0.24 -0.29 -0.22 -0.63 -0.20 -0.58
Europe (ex-UK) -0.71 -0.55 -0.51 -0.36 -0.36 -0.41 -0.38 -0.39 -0.51 -0.32
Japan 0.03 -0.15 -0.04 -0.03 -0.22 -0.06 -0.09 -0.25 -0.07 0.10
Korea -0.76 -0.65 -0.61 -0.70 -0.52 -0.48 -0.51 -0.58 -0.31 -0.63
Hong-Kong -0.11 0.01 -0.20 -0.37 -0.01 -0.33 -0.45 -0.29 -0.38 -0.56
Brazil 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.22 -0.08 -0.24 -0.16 -0.19 -0.33
Canada -0.37 -0.31 -0.50 -0.77 -0.68 -0.70 -0.71 -0.90 -0.72 -0.67
Average -0.27 -0.30 -0.34 -0.32 -0.35 -0.34 -0.38 -0.42 -0.38 -0.38
Table 6: Skewnesses of the total return performance of volatility decile portfolios.
(The first decile is the most volatile).
4.3 Correlating with standard factors
It is now time to correlate the performance of low-vol strategies with other, more
classical stock strategies. We include in these the usual Fama-French factors
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HML SMB UMD E/P D/P
low-vol 0.21 -0.56 0.01 0.51 0.63
low-β 0.32 -0.31 -0.06 0.42 0.64
Table 7: Correlation of low-vol and low-β monthly performance with other significant
market anomalies. Note that the low-vol and low-β strategies are only weakly (< 0.1)
correlated with the market mode (MKT).
(which we have recoded using our own portfolio construction methodology):
UMD (Momentum), SMB (Size) and HML (Value). We also included MKT
(the market), since we eventually want to remove any residual correlation with
the market in our analysis. Given the results of the previous section on the
role of dividends, we thought it interesting to study also the correlation with
other Value/Valuation type metrics, so we consider Earning-to-Price (E/P) and
Dividend-to-Price (D/P) on top of Book-to-Price (i.e. HML).
We show in Table 7 the correlation of low-vol and low-β with all these
strategies, computed using the corresponding global P&Ls (i.e aggregating all
geographical zones) and using monthly data. We find, as expected, a strong
anti-correlation with SMB (small cap stocks often have high volatilities), mod-
erate correlation with HML and strong positive correlation with either E/P or
D/P, again expected from the dividend bias documented above. Not surpris-
ingly, we find no correlation at all or low-vol with UMD, whereas other “value”
type strategies such as HML are well known to be anti-correlated with UMD.
We are now in position to make a residual analysis, extracting the perfor-
mance of low-vol/low-β that is not explained by the above four Fama-French
factors. The resulting residual performance is plotted in Fig.5 for the low-vol
strategy (the same results also hold for low-β). As we can see, though some of
the “alpha” of the strategies is explained by traditional factors, it seems that
there is still some additional performance, especially in the recent decades where
financing rates were lower.
However, if we include E/P and D/P as extra factors, the resulting residual
P&L becomes essentially flat over the 1980-2015 period, in agreement with
Novy-Marx’s recent results [28]. This residual performance is in fact even quite
negative in the 70s, leading to an overall Sharpe ratio on the whole period of
around −0.5 – see Fig.5. The operational conclusion is that low-vol is another
version of more standard valuation strategies, that can be used as a diversifier
in a quant type portfolio, but is not expected to add much “alpha”.
5 A compounding effect?
A simple idea that could account for the low-vol anomaly is the usual compound-
ing effect [23], is the fact that the geometrical mean is always smaller than the
arithmetic mean; in more mundane words that −20% followed by +20% results
in a drop of −4%. This implies that even if the average daily returns of all
stocks (high-vol or low-vol) were exactly equal, the monthly or yearly average
return of high-vol stocks would dip below that of low-vol stocks. Low-vol stocks
might be “defensive” just because they avoid large drops from which it is hard
to recover. This trivial mechanism could be a pervasive reason why one should
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Figure 5: Black: Residual of low-vol once the four standard Fama-French factors
(MKT, UMD, SMB and HML) are taken into account. The Sharpe ratio of the residual
performance is ≈ 0.4, but is substantially better (≈ 0.8) since the beginning of the
80’s when financing rates went down. Red: Residual of low-vol once the above four
standard Fama-French factors and the E/P and D/P factors are taken into account.
The performance becomes flat, at best, since 1980.
expect volatile stocks (or any asset for that matter) to under-perform in the
long run.
In order to assess the relevance of this idea, we have split our portfolio of
stocks every day in 10 buckets of decreasing volatility (measured, as above,
as a 100-days flat average). We then compute the average return (excluding
dividends) for each of these deciles over n days, n = 1, 5, 10, 20. We then
plot as a function of n in Fig. 6 the ratio of the average return of the first
decile (high vol.) to the average return of the last one (low-vol.). As can
be seen, ex-dividends daily returns are on average roughly the same for both
deciles: depending on the geographical zone/market, the ratio is well scattered
around unity with an average of 0.9. As the time scale over which the return is
computed increases, high-vol stocks are seen to perform less and less compared
to their defensive counterparts. This is consistent with the compounding effect
we outlined in the previous paragraphs.
However, the effect is not strong enough to explain on its own the perfor-
mance of the low-vol anomaly. Even without the dividend bias, the mere fact
that all deciles have roughly the same average return at one-day is already at
odds with the CAPM, since one would expect high vol stocks to compensate for
risk. Within the CAPM, all stocks should have similar risk-adjusted returns, at
odds with empirical observation – see again Table 5 and Fig. 4 above.
In conclusion, it seems that while the compounding effect does indeed play
a part in the low-vol anomaly, it is only part of the explanation: quite apart
from the dividend bias, risk-adjusted returns of highly volatile stocks are already
anomalously low.
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Figure 6: First decile (high vol) stocks average price ex-dividend returns, divided by
the corresponding last decile (defensive) average price return, over various time-scales
n = 1, 5, 10, 20 days, averaged over all zones, or as an aggregate portfolio. In both
cases we see that the compounding effect is detrimental to high-vol stocks.
6 FactSet data and institutional fund biases
We now turn to another source of data in search of a plausible explanation of the
low-vol anomaly, namely the “FactSet Equity Ownership” database which sum-
marizes the assets of “institutional, mutual fund, stakeholder, and float-related
share ownership information for equities” (i.e. large un-leveraged institutional
players) in some of the geographical zones studied in this paper (US, Japan,
UK, Europe ex-UK, Australia). We have aggregated these assets per company
name, and normalize this total amount held by mutual funds either by the mar-
ket capitalization of the company, so as to gauge their overall detention rate of
a given name, or by the total holdings of each fund. Both normalisations lead
to a similar conclusion, so we focus on the first one. The funds in our data hold
on average about 36% of each company in the SPX, and their total holdings
have a sizable standard deviation of about 10% around this value. This fraction
is found to be 6 % for the TOPIX in Japan, 23 % for the FTSE 100 in the UK
and our synthetic index in Europe ex-UK, and 10 % for the S&P/ASX 200 in
Australia.
We sample the portfolios of mutual funds every 6 months, and investigate
their possible biases by correlating their aggregated positions with various clas-
sical factors predictors. The results for the US is reported in Fig. 7, and other
zones behave very similarly. The biases on many standard factors are not clear,
but two of them stand out: institutional funds are on average short low-vol and
long SMB, i.e. they are over-weighted on high-vol, small cap stocks. Although
this analysis is obviously not in itself enough to explain why high-vol stocks are
overpriced, our results seem consistent with the behavioural/institutional bi-
ases alluded to above, i.e. large market players/institutions seek high volatility
stocks for the embedded leverage they provide, or for the increased probability
for the manager to get a better bonus (seen as a kind of European call option
on the performance of the fund), or else the chronic optimism of analysts that
is stronger for high-vol firms than for low-vol firms.
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Figure 7: 1 year running average of the correlation of mutual funds positions with
the standard factors: Low Vol, SMB, UMD, BPS, EPS and ROA. We clearly see that
these funds are over-allocated on small, high vol stocks.
Similar results hold for all geographical zones, and have been indeed reported
for Japanese institutional investors as well in Ref. [13]. The SMB bias is even
stronger with our second normalisation, i.e. when we divide by the total holdings
of each fund. This is expected since small funds can afford more weight on low
cap, illiquid stocks.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have dissected several aspects of the so-called low-vol and low-
β strategies. We have established several “stylized” facts about these strategies,
some already well documented (such as the strength and universality of the effect
over different geographical zones), others not clearly discussed in the literature
before (such as the strong dividend bias towards low-vol stocks).
Our most significant message is that the low-vol anomaly is the result of
two quite independent structural effects, but of similar strength. One is the
strong correlation between low-volatility and high dividend yields, so that divi-
dends in fact contribute to a substantial part of the performance of the low-vol
strategy. Second is the fact that ex-dividend returns themselves are to a first
approximation independent of the volatility level on a daily time scale, leading
to better risk-adjusted returns for low-vol stocks. This effect is further amplified
by compounding.
We have also shown that the low-vol anomaly is not localized on extreme
volatility deciles and does not come from sectoral biases. It is not due to short-
term reversals either, since the volatility estimate can be lagged by one month or
more without degrading the strength of the anomaly. We furthermore find that
the low-vol strategy has a slightly positive overall skewness, at variance with
standard Risk-Premia strategies that are characterized by negative skewnesses
[26]. It would actually be very hard to explain intuitively why investing on
low-volatility, high dividend stocks is carrying a specific risk factor that must
be compensated for!
For practical purposes, the strong dividend bias and the resulting correlation
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with other valuation metrics such as E/P or HML does make the low-vol strate-
gies to some extent redundant, at least for stocks. This does not mean that such
strategies should be excluded from the construction of “quant-factors” portfo-
lios, since they offer alternative implementations that increase diversification
and reduce operational risk.
Finally, the underlying reasons for the low-vol anomaly to persist in equity
markets are still, by and large, obscure. Although the behavioural/institutional
stories that have been put forth are persuasive and compatible with the bias
observed in the holdings of mutual funds, there is no empirical smoking gun.
We ourselves tend to believe in a universal “lottery ticket” [14] or embedded op-
tion mechanism that affects equally institutional investors (perhaps through the
bonus optionality) and private investors, leading them to over-focus on potential
spectacular upsides and forget much smaller but significant regular dividends.
But this remains very much an open question.
Acknowledgments: We thank F. Altarelli, L. De Leo, A. Landier, D. Thesmar
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Appendix A: Pools of stocks
The pools considered here are mostly the composition of standard indices for
every given day, more precisely:
• Australia: 200 stocks of the S&P/ASX 200
• UK: 100 stocks of the FTSE 100
• Europe: 600 most liquid (turnover in Euros) of the stocks mostly belong-
ing to the SBF250 (France), CDAX (Germany), OMX (Sweden), SMI
(Switzerland), IBEX (Spain), AEX (The Netherlands), FTSEMIB (Italy)
indices, with a few stocks also coming from the Finnish, Norwegian, Bel-
gian and Danish indices.
• Japan: 500 most liquid stocks of the all-shares TOPIX index
• Korea: 200 stocks of the KOSPI
• Hong Kong: around 450 stocks of the Hang Seng Composite Index
• Canada: all stocks of the S&P/TSX index
• Brasil: all stocks of the BOVESPA index (50 stocks in theory, but this
number is actually variable in time – 64 in 2015.)
• S&P500 and Russell 3000: stocks belonging to these two indexes.
• US Small Caps: US stocks are ranked by their liquidity, and a pool is
made with stocks of rank between 1501 and 2000.
Note that as a stock leaves the index, its position in the portfolio is liquidated
at the next day’s close price.
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Appendix B: Market neutrality vs. dollar neutral-
ity
The goal of this Appendix is to understand the origin of the bias in the low-
vol strategies. The scalar product of the net (1, 1, ....1) vector with the first
eigenvector times volatility is close to 95% so there should be an indirect control
of the Net Market Value (NMV) at least in principle. However, this is insufficient
as the following toy-model reveals.
In a no costs Markowitz set-up we want to maximise∑
i
xipi − µ
∑
i,j
xiσiCijxjσj
where xi is the dollar end-of-day position, pi is a predictor, µ is the usual risk-
aversion Lagrange parameter, σi the volatility of stock i, and Cij the normalized
correlation matrix. The Markowitz solution reads
xi =
1
2µσi
∑
j
C−1ij (pj/σj)
We now chose a low-vol predictor as pi = a/σi, where a is a predictability scale.
We are interested in computing NMV and Gross Market Value (GMV) in a
simplified world where the correlation matrix has one (large) market eigenvalue
λ(0) ∼ N ≫ 1 – the rest of the spectrum being a Dirac mass around a small
eigenvalue ε2. Hence:
Cij =
∑
α
λ(α)v
(α)
i v
(α)
j ≈ λ(0)P (0)ij + ε2
N−1∑
α=1
P
(α)
ij
where we have introduced the projectors on the eigenvectors P
(α)
ij = v
(α)
i v
(α)
j .
The inverse of this matrix is thus given by
C−1ij =
1
λ(0)
P
(0)
ij +
1
ε2
N−1∑
α=1
P
(α)
ij
The trace condition on the correlation matrix is Tr C = N and implies that
1/ε2 = (N − 1)/(N − λ(0)). By using the complete spanning rule δij =∑N−1
α=0 P
(α)
ij we end up with
C−1ij ≃
1
1− λ(0)/N
[
δij −
(
1− 1
λ(0)
)
P
(0)
ij
]
Plugging this into the Markowitz solution yields to
xi =
a
2µ
1
1− λ(0)/N

σ−3i −
(
1− 1
λ(0)
)
v
(0)
i σ
−1
i
∑
j
v
(0)
j σ
−2
j


The net market value is then NMV =
∑
i xi and depends on the prefactor a/µ.
This pre-factor will not matter in the ratio NMV / GMV but we can get rid of
it anyway by using
R2 =
∑
ij
xiσiCijxjσj ≃
(
a
2µ
)2(
1− λ
(0)
N
)
−1
N
(〈σ−4〉 − 〈σ−2〉2)
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which leads to
NMV =
R√
(N − λ(0)) (〈σ−4〉 − 〈σ−2〉2)

N〈σ−3〉 − (1− 1
λ(0)
)∑
i
v
(0)
i σ
−1
i
∑
j
v
(0)
j σ
−2
j


We now use λ(0) ≫ 1 and assume v(0)i ≈ 1/
√
N . Then:
NMV ≈ RN
√
1
(N − λ(0))
〈y3〉 − 〈y〉〈y2〉√
〈y4〉 − 〈y2〉2
where we have introduced yi = 1/σi and where we recall that 〈· · · 〉 stands for
a flat cross-sectional average over the stocks. As a check, we can compute the
risk exposure to the market mode:
R(0) =
√
λ(0)
∑
i
xiσiv
(0)
i ≈
R√
λ(0)(1− λ(0)/N))
〈y2〉√
〈y4〉 − 〈y2〉2
which has the correct behaviour for large λ(0). The same kind of calculation
can be done to get the GMV =
∑
i |xi| and one gets:
NMV ≃ RN
√
1
(N − λ(0))
〈y|y2 − 〈y2〉|〉√
〈y4〉 − 〈y2〉2
So the net over gross ratio is
NMV
GMV
=
〈y3〉 − 〈y〉〈y2〉
〈y|y2 − 〈y2〉|〉 ,
showing that this ratio is related to the higher moments of the cross-sectional
volatility distribution, and is a priori non zero. One could assume the volatility
distribution is an inverse Gamma distribution and compute the above number,
or estimate directly these moments from the data. The average value lies in the
30-40% range, and is thus much higher than naively thought. Hence, net dollar
exposure is a real issue when dealing with low-vol portfolios.
Appendix C: Low-vol/low-β correlation
The correlation between low-vol and low-β does not come as a complete surprise
since both β and volatility are supposed to be risk indicators pertaining to a
given stock. On the other hand, the fact that using the market exposure of
a stock gives almost exactly the same strategy as its volatility cries for an
explanation. Here, we show that a simplified theoretical framework allows one
to capture why this is the case.
We start from a standard one-factor model
ri = βiΦ + εi (2)
where the market factor Φ is defined for simplicity as the equi-weighted average
stock return: Φ =
∑
i ri/N , i.e.
∑
i βi = N . We assume that Φ and εi are
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Figure 8: Comparison of the simple prediction, Eq. 5, with data using 2000 US
stocks from 1971 to 2011. The black line corresponds to the model, while the purple
line corresponds to a running average through the points. The color code indicates
the density of data points.
uncorrelated (but not necessarily independent). The exposure βi is computed
from a linear regression and can be written as
βi = ρi,Φ
σi
σΦ
, (3)
with ρi,Φ the correlation between the market return and the return of stock i.
We now assume that in a first approximation all pair correlations are equal
to a given ρ0, i.e. the correlation matrix has the form ρi,j = δi,j + ρ0(1− δi,j).
This of course neglects sector effects but is not completely off the mark. Up
to 1/N corrections, the market volatility is then simply given by σ2Φ = ρ0σ
2
av.,
where σav. =
∑
i σi/N is the cross-sectional volatility average. Similarly, the
stock/market correlation can be computed, up to 1/N corrections, as:
ρi,Φ =
〈ri 1N
∑
j rj〉
σiσΦ
≈ ρ0σiσav.
σi
√
ρ0σav.
=
√
ρ0 . (4)
Hence within this highly schematic framework we find the simple relation:
βi =
√
ρ0
σi
σΦ
≡ σi
σav.
, (5)
which could have been guessed by symmetry.
This result is interesting for several reasons: (i) it relies on the simplified
hypothesis on pair-correlations but it does not require this average correlation ρ0
to be known, nor to be constant over time; (ii) it suggests a natural scaling that
one should use when looking at large, heterogeneous data sets and, finally, (iii) it
shows that β and σ are simply proportional one to each other, and therefore that
low-vol and low-β are bound to be highly correlated. As shown in Fig. 8, our
simple prediction is indeed backed by data: we compare the model to the data
obtained for 2000 US stocks from 1971 to 2011, where each point corresponds
19
to a pair σi, βi. The regime where β saturates for σ large is not explained by
the model and it would require more sophisticated assumptions. As shown by
the density of points, though, this regime only represents a small part of the
data set.
Note that within the same framework, one finds that the idiosyncratic volatil-
ity 〈ε2i 〉 is given by:
〈ε2i 〉 = σ2i − β2i σ2Φ = β2i [1− ρ0]σ2av., (6)
showing that the idiosyncratic volatility is also strongly correlated to the β.
References
[1] F. Black, Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing, The Jour-
nal of Business, 45, 444-455 (1972).
[2] R. A. Haugen, A. J. Heins, On the Evidence Supporting the Existence of
Risk Premiums in the Capital Market, Working paper, unpublished (1972).
[3] R. A. Haugen, A. J. Heins, Risk and the Rate of Return on Financial Assets:
Some Old Wine in New Bottles, Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, pp. 775-784 (1975).
[4] W. F. Sharpe, Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under
conditions of risk, Journal of Finance, 19, 425-442 (1964)
[5] For well documented reviews on how poorly this model fares in practice, see
e.g. P. Fernandez, CAPM: an absurd model, Business Valuation Review, 34,
4-23 (2015), and J. R. Thompson, L. S. Baggett, W. C. Wojciechowski and
E. Williams, Nobels for Nonsense, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,
29, 3-18 (2006).
[6] A. Ang, R. J. Hodrick, Y. Xing, and X. Zhang, The Cross- Section of
Volatility and Expected Returns, Journal of Finance, 61, 259-299 (2006).
[7] A. Frazzini, L. H. Pedersen, Betting against beta, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 111, 1-25 (2014)
[8] N. Baltas, Low-Risk Investing: perhaps not everywhere, UBS Quantitative
Monographs, July 2015.
[9] R. Clarke, H. de Silva, S. Thorley, Minimum-Variance Portfolios in the
U.S. Equity Market, J. Portfolio Management, Fall 2006.
[10] D. C. Blitz, P. van Vliet, The Volatility Effect: Lower Risk without Lower
Return, Journal of Portfolio Management, pp. 102-113 (2007).
[11] M. Baker and R. Haugen, Low Risk Stocks Outperform within All Ob-
servable Markets of the World, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2055431,
(2012).
[12] L. H. Chen, G. J. Jiang, D. D. Xu and T. Yao, Dissecting the Idiosyncratic
Volatility Anomaly, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023883, (2012).
20
[13] S. Iwasawa, T. Ushiwama, A Behavioral Economics Exploration into the
Volatility Anomaly, Public Policy Review (Japan), Vol. 9, No. 3, September
2013
[14] N. Barberis, M. Huang, Stocks as Lotteries; The Implications of Probability
Weighting for Security Prices, American Economic Review, 98:5, 2066-2100
(2008).
[15] B. Boyer, T. Mitton, and K. Vorkink, Expected Idiosyncratic Skewness,
Rev. Financ. Stud. 23, 169-202 (2010).
[16] K. Hou, R. Loh, Have we solved the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle?
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2190976, (2014).
[17] M. Clemens, Dividend Investing, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2056317,
(2012).
[18] E. Ramos, J. C. Hans, Finding opportunities through the low-volatility
anomaly, BMO mimeo, Sept. 2013.
[19] T. Garrett, S. Russell, Gamblers Favor Skewness not Risk: Further Ev-
idence from United States Lottery Games, Economics Letters, 63, 85-90
(1999).
[20] B. M. Barber, T. Odean, All That Glitters: The Effect of Attention and
News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors,
Review of Financial Studies, 21, 785-818 (2008).
[21] J. C. Hsu, H. Kudo, T. Yamada, When Sell-Side Analysts Meet High-
Volatility Stocks: An Alternative Explanation for the Low-Volatility Puzzle,
working paper, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061824
[22] M. Baker, B. Bradley, J. Wurgler, Benchmarks as limits to arbitrage: un-
derstanding the low-volatility anomaly, Financial Analysts Journal 67, 40-
54 (2011).
[23] D. di Bartolomeo, Low Volatility Equity Investing: Anomaly or Algebraic
Artifact, Northfield, October 2013.
[24] F. Fu, Idiosyncratic Risk and the Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns,
Journal of Financial Economics 91, 24-37 (2009).
[25] A. Ang, R. J. Hodrick, Y. Xing, and X. Zhang, High Idiosyncratic Volatil-
ity and Low Returns: International and Further US Evidence, Journal of
Financial Economics, 91, 1-23 (2009).
[26] Y. Lempérière, C. Deremble, Ph. Seager, M. Potters and J.-Ph. Bouchaud,
Tail risk premiums versus pure alpha, Risk Magazine, April 2015. Long ver-
sion available at: http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/1409.7720, submitted to Quan-
titative Finance.
[27] X. Li, R. N. Sullivan, L. Garcia-Feijoo, The Limits to Arbitrage and
the Low-Volatility Anomaly, Financial Analysts Journal, 70, 52-63 (Jan-
uary/February 2014).
[28] R. Novy-Marx, Understanding defensive equity, working paper (Sept. 2014)
21
